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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
nates the objectionable words "or effect," stating that it is against
public policy to advertise for sale, offer for sale, or sell below
cost "with intent and purpose" of inducing the purchase of other
merchandise, unfairly diverting trade from a competitor, impair-
ing fair competition, or injuring the public welfare, where the
result is to tend to deceive any purchaser, substantially lessen
competition, unreasonably restrain trade, or create a monopoly.
Particularly significant is a section making these activities "prima
facie evidence of intent to injure competitors and to destroy or
substantially lessen competition."13 The provisions relating to the
calculation of costs of goods were changed so as to define cost as
the invoice cost or the replacement cost plus a proportionate cost
of doing business less certain appropriate discounts.
Whatever limitations the Oklahoma courts may place upon
legislation of this type, the Legislature of Oklahoma is determined
to keep the act upon the statute books. Of the other Southwestern
States Arkansas1 and Louisiana15 have unfair sales acts similar
to the Oklahoma statute. Texas and New Mexico have not enacted
such legislation. James S. Conley.
REAL PROPERTY
ADVERSE POSSESSION (ARKANSAS)
Two opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, rendered three
weeks apart, affirmed an established rule in Arkansas that in boun-
dary disputes a mistake as to the true boundary is material, and
that an intention to claim title to the disputed boundary as located
is essential in establishing adverse possession of the land of
another.
18 Cf. similar provision in the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, § 1(b) (1936);
15 U.S.C.A. § 13(b).
14 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 70-303.
1 5 LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart. 1939) §§ 4931.1-4931.8.
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In Hickey v. Faucette' the property in dispute was a strip of
land off one side of a lot which was six inches wide at one end and
two inches wide at the other end. In Carter v. Roberson2 two neigh-
bors contested title to a strip of land about seven feet wide.
The facts of the two cases were generally similar in that the
disputed boundary lines were marked by a hedge in one case and a
garage, driveway, and fence in the other. Both defendants had held
adverse possession of the land up to the disputed boundary for
more than seven years. In both cases the true boundary line estab-
lished by a surveyor showed there had been a mistake as to the
location of the boundary between the properties owned by the
plaintiffs and defendants.
The court, in finding for the defendant in both instances, stated
the rule established in Goodwin v. Garibaldi:?
"When a landowner, through mistake as to his boundary line, takes
possession of land of an adjacent owner, intending to claim only to
the true boundary, such possession is not adverse, and, though con-
tinued for the statutory period, does not divest title, but when he takes
possession of the land under the belief that he owns it, encloses it, and
holds it continuously for the statutory period, under a claim of owner-
ship, without any recognition of the possible right of another thereto on
account of mistake in the boundary line, such possession and holding is
adverse, and when continued for the statutory period will divest the
title of the former owner, who has been thus excluded from possession."
(Italics supplied by the court.)
From the evidence presented in both cases the court found that de-
fendants had intended to claim ownership to the disputed boun-
dary line, thereby bringing the issue within the italicized portion
of the rule.
Arkansas, in its line of decisions following the Garibaldi case,
aligns itself with other jurisdictions, including Texas,4 which hold
1214 Ark. 560, 217 S. W. 2d. (1949).
2214 Ark. 750, 217 S. W. 2d. 846 (1949).
8 83 Ark. 74, 102 S. W. 706, 707 (1907).
' Tucker v. Angelina County Lumber Co., 216 S. W. 149 (Tex. Civ. App.- 1919).
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that the fact of possession of another's land under mistake is
material, and that an intention to claim title to the boundary, as
located, in spite of any mistake, must be found, such intention
being essential to adverse possession.
The rule established in Arkansas is more strict than the rule of
other jurisdictions wherein the courts have held that possession
is adverse, without reference to the fact that it is based on mistake,
it being sufficient that there is an actual and visible possession
without any reference to the fact that it is based on mistake, it
being sufficient that there is an actual and visible possession with-
out any recognition of the other's title.5
NOTICE TO TERMINATE MONTH TO MONTH TENANCY (ARKANSAS)
Arkansas has no statute modifying the common law rule as to
notice necessary to terminate a month to month tenancy. Notice to
terminate is sufficient if given one month in advance of the day
ending the monthly rental period.6 The fact that the notice ends
with the first day of the monthly period rather than the last day
has been held not to invalidate it if the notice covered one full
rental period.'
In Hastings v. Nash8 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a
notice was sufficient even though it did not end on either the first or
the last day of the monthly period. In that case the landlord gave
written notice on August 9, 1946, to vacate the premises not later
than November 9, 1946. The monthly rental period was from the
7th of the month to the 7th of each succeeding month. The court
said that the tenant could not complain where he was given longer
notice to quit than the law requires.
The holding in Hastings v. Nash is at variance with the generally
stated rule9 that a notice to terminate a month to month tenancy
5 4 TIFFANY, RAL PRoPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1159.
I Dillon v. Miller, 207 Ark. 401, 180 S. W. 2d. 832 (1944).
7 Ibid.
8 
-Ark.-, 219 S. W. 2d. 225 (1949).
9 See 86 A.L.R. 1349 (1933).
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must require the tenant to terminate at the end of the monthly
period. The result reached in the Hastings case seems desirable
because the notice given allowed the tenant to quit on the last day
of the monthly period or a few days later.
DUTY OF LIFE TENANT TO PAY TAXES (NEW MEXICO)
In Zaring v. Lomax"° testatrix, who died March 1, 1938, de-
vised a lot in the town of Santa Rosa, New Mexico, to her son for
life with remainder to the heirs of his body. In June, 1939, the
son of the testatrix conveyed the lot by warranty deed to Fluit
without mention of the life estate and remainder. In November,
1939, a child (defendant in the case) was born to the son's wife.
On December 4, 1939, the lot was sold for 1938 taxes, the pur-
chaser acquiring a perfected and formal deed on June 1, 1942. On
October 1, 1945, Fluit by warranty deed purported to convey the
lot to plaintiff. On November 28, 1945, plaintiff purchased the tax
deed from its owner, paying the amount of its cost.
Plaintiff contended that his purchase of the tax deed gave him
paramount title extinguishing all prior equities and interests. De-
fendant claimed that he was remainderman under his grand-
mother's will, that he would own full title upon death of his father,
and that plaintiff, as subsequent grantee of the life estate, was
under the duty to pay the taxes on the lot in order to preserve the
life estate and the remainder.
The general rule is that the life tenant is under a duty to pay
taxes assessed during the tenancy." The life tenant cannot acquire
adverse title to the property by purchasing it at a tax sale. 2 The
purchase of a valid tax title by a life tenant will be held to be
for the benefit of the life tenant and the remainderman. 8 Ordi-
narily, the doctrine of caveat emptor is applied to a purchaser of
a tax title.1
4
10 53 N. M. 273. 206 P. 2d. 706 (1949).
14 THOMPSON. REAL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed. 1939) § 1620.
12 5 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed. 1940) § 2919.
1 2 THOMPSON, RE.AL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed. 1939) § 806.
14 5 THOMPSON. REAL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed. 1939) § 2929.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court held that where "one... buys
a life estate from the tenant for life after a valid tax title had be-
come effective, and thereafter buys the tax title, his purchase
inures to the benefit of the whole estate, and will be held in effect
a redemption from a tax sale."' 5 Therefore, the plaintiff was held
to own only a life estate, and the defendant had a vested remainder.
The dissenting opinion in the case took the position that the
plaintiff purchased a nullity from Fluit. This purchase was made
after the tax title had become effective. Therefore, the plaintiff by
purchasing the paramount tax title was entitled to full title. The
dissenting opinion found no duty on the part of the plaintiff to re-
deem the property. This duty was on Fluit who had allowed the
tax deed to become effective.
The dissenting opinion points out a serious weakness in the
holding of the majority. The statute regarding tax sales allows a
valid tax title to extinguish all prior titles, interests and equities.
The owner of the tax title in this case had paramount title to the
exclusion of both the plaintiff and defendant. The grant of the
tax title to the plaintiff reduced the title to a tax redemption re-
newing the vested remainder and the life estate.
DEEDS-WAIVER OF CONDITION PRECEDENT (OKLAHOMA)
May a grantor waive performance of a condition precedent in
a deed by his voluntary acts and silence? That was the question
presented for decision in Stewart v. Colvin.
16
Grantor's deed contained a stipulation that grantee should pay
$1.00 to each of three named persons before the deed should take
full force and effect. Shortly after execution, the deed was de-
livered to grantee who took possession, paid taxes and insurance,
made repairs of the premises, remained in control of the premises
until the death of the grantor, and at the time of the suit was still
in possession of the premises. The grantee did not pay the amounts
15 206 P. 2d. at 708.
18 - Okla.- . 214 P. 2d. 229 (1949).
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specified in the deed prior to the grantor's death. Plaintiff, admin-
istratrix of the estate of the deceased grantor, contended that since
the condition precedent had not been performed, title remained
in the deceased grantor at the time of his death.
The court recognized that where the terms of a deed create an
estate on condition precedent, title will not vest in the grantee
until such condition is performed,17 but further recognized that
performance of such condition may, however, be waived by the
grantor.'8 The court also cited a rule of waiver as applied to a
condition subsequent in Sanderson v. Davis.'9
The court found that, even though it was the intention of the
deceased grantor at the time the instrument was drafted that title
should not vest or pass to the grantee until the specified payments
were made, since the evidence showed that the grantor thereafter
voluntarily permitted the grantee to take possession and control
of the premises and to continue to occupy and control the same
for a period of eight years and until the grantor's death without
insisting upon performance of the condition, he thereby waived
the condition, and title thereupon vested in the grantee.
Tiffany in his treatise on real property states:
"There are dicta to the effect that a condition precedent may be waived,
as well as a condition subsequent. This, however, appears open to ques-
tion. The waiver of such a condition involves an attempt to create,
instead of a possibility of an estate to commence in futuro, an actual
estate commencing immediately, an entirely different interest, and one
cannot, in other than exceptional cases, create an estate in land orally,
or, it would seem, even in writing, by words of waiver only. "20
In light of the foregoing statement, the theoretical soundn6ss
of the decision may be questioned.
7 Fraley Admr. v. Wilkinson, 79 Okla.. 21. 191 Pac. (1920) ; Wellsville Oil Co.
v. Miller, 44 Okla. 493, 145 Pac. 344 (1914).
18 The court relied on statements in 26 CJ.S., Deeds, § 158, p. 497.
19 89 Okla. 271. 215 Pac. 603 (1923).
20 1 TIFFANY. REAL POpmTY (3d ed. 1939) § 204.
336 1950] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949
BROKER'S COMMISSION (TEXAS)
In Buratti & Montandon v. Tennant2 a real estate broker was
suing a seller for a commission on a completed sale. The issue
was whether the Statute of Frauds22 was satisfied. The only written
memorandum was the contract between the buyer and seller, which
provided that if the buyer failed to consummate the contract, the
seller would retain the cash deposit as liquidated damages and
would pay the usual broker's commission. The Texas Supreme
Court held that the amount of the commission could not be proved
without parol evidence and that the written contract did not satisfy
statutory requirements.
In the court below it had been held that the memorandum pro-
vided for a commission in case of a breach of contract and for-
feiture of the cash deposit but not in the case of a completed sale.2"
This holding was contrary to Spires v. Mann,24 which allowed re-
covery under a similar contract where the amount of the com-
mission was stated explicitly. The theory in the Spires case was
that the provision for a stated commission gave rise to an implied
covenant to pay the same commission in case of a completed sale.
The supreme court did not resolve the conflict between the Spires
case and the holding of the court of appeals in the principal case.
The complete contracts in the two cases were not before the court,
and it was unable to say whether a covenant to pay a certain com-
mission would be implied. Thus, the law in Texas remains some-
what unsettled as to whether a contract is sufficient basis for a
recovery on a completed sale where the amount of the commis-
sion has been stated with certainty only with respect to a breach
of contract and forfeiture.
21147 Tex. 536. 218 S. W. 2d. 842 (1949).
22 Tmx REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon. 1948) art. 6573a22.
23 215 S. W. 2d. 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
21 173 S. W. 2d. 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), writ of error refused.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF LEASE CONTRACT (TEXAS)
In the case of Maloy v. Wagner" plaintiff sought enforce-
ment of a lease contract which was oral and for a three-year
term. The trial court decreed specific performance of the con-
tract. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered for the
defendants. A writ of error was granted on plaintiff's petition
to determine whether, under the facts presented, the three-year
oral contract to lease should be enforced, notwithstanding the
Statute of Frauds."6 The supreme court reversed the court below
and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The trial court found as facts that the three-year lease contract
was entered into, that pursuant to such contract the plaintiff
entered into possession of the land and fully paid the agreed
rent for two years, and that the plaintiff made valuable improve-
ments on the land which were of a permanent nature.
The court of civil appeals had relied upon the rule with refer-
ence to oral lease contracts for more than one year stated by Chief
Justice Phillips in the case of Hooks v. Bridgewater:7
"From an early time it has been the rule of this court steadily adhered
to, that to relieve a parol sale of land from the operation of the statute
of frauds, three things were necessary: 1. Payment of the consideration.
2. Possession l4y the vendee. And 3. The making by the vendee of val-
uable and permanent improvements upon the land with the consent of
the vendor; or, without such improvements, the presence of such facts
as would make the transaction a fraud upon the purchaser if it were
not enforced.... Each of these three elements is indispensable, and
they must all exist."
The court of civil appeals in reversing the trial court found (1)
25 147 Tex. 486, 217 S. W. 2d. 667 (1949), retvg 212 S. W. 2d. 850 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
26 Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3995: "No action shall be brought in
any court in any of the following cases, unless the promise or agreement upon which
such action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him thereunto law-
lawfully authorized.... 4. Upon any contract for the sale of real estate or the lease
thereof for a longer term than one year...."
27 111 Tex. 122, 126, 229 S. W. 1114, 1116 (1921).
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that defendant Wagner had not consented to the improvements,
(2) that plaintiff had made a "nice profit" from his occupation,
and (3) that denial of relief would not work a fraud on plaintiff.
The supreme court disagreed with the first finding and said that
the record showed the contrary. The second finding was held
immaterial, and the third finding was held not justified under
the facts established.
The supreme court reaffirmed the rule of the Bridgewater deci-
sion, omitting the statement of the alternative to the making of im-
provements, since the facts did not call it into operation. In the
Bridgewater case the alternative had been stated and applied in
a situation in which the transferee had not taken possession of or
made improvements to the land- The court also referred to a
statement in Jones v. Mawman2" that the person seeking to enforce
the contract must have "made valuable permanent improvements
on the land in reliance thereon." (Emphasis by the court.)
The court concluded that an estoppel was created against the
defendants and that a fraud upon Maloy would result if the defend-
ants were permitted to repudiate the contract. Thus, an equitable
basis for enforcing the parol agreement was found. The court
cited the following statements in support of its decision that a
suit in equity would lie:
"[The courts] ... must give heed also to considerations of an equitable
character when the facts warrant, as for instance, when every act of
plaintiff may be explained apart from the oral contract in question,
and none of his acts are explainable apart from it. In other words,
what is done by the parties must supply the key to what is promised. ' 29
"But where there is payment of the consideration, the surrender of
possession, and the making of valuable and permanent improvements
on the faith of the purchase with the owner's knowledge or consent,
there is created an estoppel against him and it may fairly be said that
28 145 Tex. 596, 599, 200 S. W. 2d. 819, 820 (1947).
29 Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 112, 113, 213 S. W. 2d. 530, 533 (1949)y
80 Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. at 128, 229 S. W. at 1117.
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a Iraud upon the purchaser would result iJ the owner were permitted to
repudiate the contract."30 (Emphasis by the court.)
Earlier cases were cited, among them Ward v. Etier,8 ' to the
effect that where possession was had with the consent of the trans-
feror, it was not necessary for the transferee to allege and prove
that the improvements were made with the acquiescence or consent
of the transferor. The court said that the cases in which it had
been held that the improvements must be made with the knowl-
edge or acquiescence of the transferor at the time they were
being made had been situations in which the transferee took pos-
session without knowledge of the transferor or without his consent,
or had made the improvements after the lessor had repudiated the
contract. 2
The court stated that the principal case fitted closely into the
factual pattern of Ward v. Etier.8 In that case defendant Ward
had no knowledge that improvements were being placed on the
premises before they were completed. The judgment in that case,
decreeing specific performance of a parol contract to lease, was
considered decisive of the principal case.
In contrasting the principal case and the Etier case with the
Bridgewater case, the court pointed out there was an essential but
not controlling difference, in that in the Bridgewater case both
parties to the agreement were not before the court to testify, where-
as in the principal case, as well as in the Etier case, both parties
to the agreement were present and testified.
The principal case clarifies the doctrine of the Bridgewater
decision, particularly with respect to the necessity for consent by
the transferor to the making of improvements and with respect
to the relevancy of profits made by the transferee. A large area
of question remains, however, as to the circumstances which will
satisfy the alternative requirement, "presence of such facts as
'3 113 Tex. 83, 251 S. W. 1028 (1923).
82 See 101 A.LR. 923. 1067 (1936).
33 113 Tex. 83, 251 S. W. 1028 (1923).
